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Abstract
We develop a low-complexity coding scheme to achieve covert communications over binary-input discrete
memoryless channels (BI-DMCs). We circumvent the impossibility of covert communication with linear codes by
introducing non-linearity through the use of pulse position modulation (PPM) and multilevel coding (MLC). We
show that the MLC-PPM scheme exhibits many appealing properties; in particular, the channel at a given index
level remains stationary as the number of level increases, which allows one to use families of channel capacity- and
channel resolvability-achieving codes to concretely instantiate the covert communication scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
While signal processing techniques, such as spread-spectrum and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), have
been widely used to enforce low probability of detection (LPD) over communication channels in the presence
of adversarial eavesdroppers, the information-theoretic limits of covert communications have only been recently
characterized. A unique feature of covert communications is the existence of a “square root law,” similar to that
of steganography, which constrains the scaling of the number of reliable and covert communication bits to O(√n)
if the blocklength is n [2], [3]. The exact constants in front of
√
n have also been characterized for classical and
quantum point-to-point channels [4]–[9], and can be interpreted as the “covert capacity” of these channels.
One of the key insights obtained from the characterization of the information-theoretic limit is the need to
use codebooks comprised of “low-weight” codewords. Specifically, if symbol 0 denotes the “innocent symbol”
corresponding to the absence of communication, codewords should contain a fraction of non-zero symbols on the
order of O( 1√
n
) as n goes to infinity. Unfortunately, despite information-theoretic results showing the existence of
low-complexity covert communications codes using a concatenated scheme [10], explicit code constructions have
remained elusive. The main challenge in designing such codes is precisely the need for low weights, which is
not satisfied with standard linear codes. We actually show a stronger negative result in this paper, namely that no
sequence of linear codes with growing dimension can approach any fraction of the covert capacity. Consequently,
one must introduce some non-linearity in the coding scheme. A previous attempt considered the use of a binary
polarization-based scheme with non-linearity introduced through stochastic encoding [11]; however, the analysis of
the speed of polarization in [11] only leads to “low-weight” codewords containing a fraction O( 1nγ ) of non-zero
symbols with 0 < γ  12 as n goes to infinity. The resulting large codeword weight was mitigated by changing the
model and allowing asynchronism and uncertainty in the time of transmission [12], [13], at the cost of a significant
increase in the effective blocklength. This result could perhaps be improved by using non-binary polar codes.
We follow here a different approach and develop a covert communication scheme using multilevel coding (MLC)
together with pulse position modulation (PPM) for binary-input discrete memoryless channels (BI-DMCs). As
already shown in [14] with random non-binary codes, the use of PPM allows one to partly handle covertness through
modulation, which potentially simplifies the coding. The use of MLC allows us to exploit low-complexity binary
codes that are channel capacity- and channel resolvability-achieving, such as polar codes [15], and circumvents the
challenges associated with non-binary code design that was left open in [14]. We presented the initial results of this
research in [1], in which we proved the existence of optimal codes for covert communication using MLC-PPM for
binary symmetric channels (BSCs). In this paper, we show the existence of optimal covert communication codes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory [1]. This work was
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2for BI-DMCs. In [1], we also used dithering with public common randomness to simplify the analysis, whereas
here we exploit the properties of the channel perceived by each level of MLC instead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the common notations used
throughout the paper. In Section III, we prove that it is impossible to achieve covert communication over a BI-DMC
using linear codes without introducing some non-linearity after the encoding operation. In Section IV, we introduce
MLC-PPM scheme for covert communication over BI-DMC and provide an information-theoretic proof of the
achievability of covert capacity using the scheme. In Section V, we discuss the design of practical codes by
exploiting various properties of the resulting equivalent channel derived from the use of MLC-PPM scheme and
provide an coding scheme using polar codes. In Section VI, we conclude the paper with a discussion on our main
contributions.
II. NOTATION
We briefly introduce the notation used throughout the paper. We denote random variables by uppercase letters,
e.g., X , their realizations by lowercase, e.g., x, and vectors of random variables and their realizations by their
corresponding boldface letters, e.g., X and x, respectively. We denote the transition probability of a BI-DMC
channel with input X ∈ X = {0, 1} and output Y ∈ Y by WY |X . Let Ja, bK be the set of integers between bac
and dbe. When using as a subscript or a superscript, we denote Ja, bK by a:b. For q ∈ N, m = 2q, and i ∈ J1,mK,
we define a PPM symbol x˜i of order m as the binary vector of length m such that the i-th component is one
and all other components are zero. The use of PPM modulation over a BI-DMC defines a “super channel” with
transition probability W˜Y˜ |X˜ , W
⊗m
Y |X whose input alphabet is the set X˜q = {x˜i}mi=1 of all PPM symbols of order
m and whose output alphabet is Y˜q = Y2q . For any set S ⊆ J1, qK and a sequence X1, . . . , Xq, we denote the set
of random variables (Xi)i∈S by XS . Using this notation, we have X1:q = (X1, . . . , Xq). For a binary sequence
x1:q ∈ Fq2, we let d(x1:q) ∈ N denote the decimal equivalent by taking the least significant bit as the first bit, and
d−1(·) denote the inverse operation of d(·), that is, d−1(d(x1:q)) = x1:q. For any set S ⊆ J1, qK, we define
Aq(xS) , {j ∈ J1, 2qK : (d−1(j − 1))S = xS}, ∀xS ∈ F|S|2 , (1)
where (d−1(j− 1))S denotes the components of d−1(j− 1) indexed by the elements of S. The complement of the
set Aq(xS) with respect to (w.r.t.) J1, 2qK is denoted by Aq(xS)c and is given by
Aq(xS)c , J1, 2qK\Aq(xS). (2)
We define a PPM mapper as
x˜ : Fq2 → X˜ q : x1:q 7→ x˜(x1:q) = x˜Aq(x1:q) = x˜d(x1:q)+1, (3)
which is a one-to-one mapping from the set of all binary vectors of length q to the set of all PPM symbols of order
2q. Hence, we denote the PPM super channel equivalently in terms of the binary vector input as W˜Y˜ |X˜ = W˜Y˜ |X1:q .
We use both notations interchangeably depending on the situation. For the channel W˜Y˜ |X˜ , the distribution at the
output by a uniformly distributed PPM symbols of order m as the input is denoted by PmPPM and is given by
PmPPM(z˜) ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
W˜Y˜ |X˜(z˜|x˜i) =
1
2q
∑
x1:q∈X q
W˜Y˜ |X1:q(z˜|x1:q). (4)
Through out this paper, log represents the natural logarithm and log2 represents the logarithm to the base 2.
III. IMPOSSIBILITY OF COVERT COMMUNICATION WITH LINEAR CODES OVER BINARY-INPUT DISCRETE
MEMORYLESS CHANNELS (BI-DMCS)
We now consider a BI-DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) with X , {0, 1} and 0 the innocent symbol for covert communication
corresponding to the absence of transmission. We set Q1 ,WZ|X=1 and Q0 ,WZ|X=0. Our objective is to show
that, under mild assumptions, covert communication with linear codes is not possible because such communication
is easily detected; in particular, we show that no linear code can achieve the covert capacity.
3A small misconception: One might think that linear codes might not be covert because the linearity constraint
requires the sum of codewords to be a codeword; consequently, linear combinations of low-weight codewords
would result in a codeword with high weight. This is, however, insufficient to argue that linear codes cannot be
covert. In fact, one could consider a systematic code with unit-weight codewords in the generator matrix, i.e,
G = ( Ik 0k×n−k ), where Ik is the identity matrix of size k. All codewords of this code have weight at most
k. Of course, this code would hardly be covert, mainly because the structure of the generator matrix allows an
attacker to dismiss the last n− k codeword components. The next proposition formalizes this.
Proposition 1. Consider an (n, k) binary linear code with (n, k) ∈ (N∗)2, n > k. Assume that the code is used for
communication over a BI-DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) with uniformly distributed messages. There exists a binary hypothesis
test with false alarm probability α and missed-detection probability β such that
0 6 α 6 16
kχ2(Q1‖Q0) ,
0 6 β 6 1
k
(
16
χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
8χ3(Q1‖Q0)
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2 − 4
)
,
where Q1 ,WZ|X=1, Q0 ,WZ|X=0, and for t ∈ N∗ and t > 2
χt(Q1‖Q0) =
∑
z
(Q1(z)−Q0(z))t
Qt−10 (z)
. (5)
Proof. Let G ∈ Fk×n2 be a generator matrix of the code, with columns {gi}ni=1 ∈ Fk2 . Denote the set of 2k
codewords by C , {c`}2k`=1. Let m be the number of non all-zero columns in G, and denote the corresponding
column indices {ij}mj=1. Note that k 6 m by definition of the dimension of the code. The observations of the
adversary in the m positions {ij}mj=1 constitute a sufficient statistics for the detection of communication, and the
optimal test is a log-likelihood ratio test restricted to the m positions. We consider a suboptimal test that only
operates on a subset of indices S ⊂ {ij}mj=1 that indexes all the distinct columns of G. Since the matrix G is
binary, this implies that the columns {gi}i∈S are pairwise linearly independent and |S| > k. Given an observation
z = (z1, . . . , zn) at the output of the channel, construct the statistics
T (z) , 1|S|
∑
j∈S
Q1(zj)−Q0(zj)
Q0(zj)
. (6)
In the absence of communication, we have for any j ∈ S that Zj ∼ Q0, and therefore
EQ⊗n0 (T (Z)) =
1
|S|
∑
j∈S
EQ0
(
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
)
= 0, (7)
VarQ⊗n0 (T (Z)) =
1
|S|2
∑
j∈S
EQ0
(
(Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj))2
Q0(Zj)2
)
+2
∑
j,`∈S:j<`
EQ0
(
(Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj))
Q0(Zj)
)
EQ0
(
(Q1(Z`)−Q0(Z`))
Q0(Z`)
) (8)
=
1
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0). (9)
In the presence of communication, let Q̂n represent the output distribution induced by the code, where
Q̂n(z) =
1
2k
∑
v∈Fk2
W ⊗nZ|X(z|vG). (10)
4For any j ∈ S, we have Zj ∼ 12Q0 + 12Q1 by [16, Problem 3.25]. Consider now j, ` ∈ S, j 6= ` and define
Nab = |{c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C : cj = a, c` = b}| for a, b ∈ {0, 1}. By definition of S, columns gj and g` are
linearly independent so that N00 = N01 = N10 = N11 = 2k−2. Hence,
P
(
Zj = z, Z` = z
′) = N00
2k
Q0(z)Q0(z
′) +
N01
2k
Q0(z)Q1(z
′) +
N10
2k
Q1(z)Q0(z
′) +
N11
2k
Q1(z)Q1(z
′) (11)
=
1
4
Q0(z)Q0(z
′) +
1
4
Q0(z)Q1(z
′) +
1
4
Q1(z)Q0(z
′) +
1
4
Q1(z)Q1(z
′). (12)
Therefore,
EQ̂n(T (Z)) =
1
|S|
∑
j∈S
E 1
2
Q0+
1
2
Q1
(
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
)
(13)
=
∑
z
(
Q0(z) +
1
2
(Q1(z)−Q0(z))
)
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
(14)
=
1
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0). (15)
Similarly,
EQ̂n
(
T (Z)2
)
=
1
|S|2EQ̂n
∑
j∈S
(Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj))2
Q0(Zj)2
+
∑
j,`∈S:j 6=`
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
Q1(Z`)−Q0(Z`)
Q0(Z`)
 (16)
=
1
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
1
2 |S|χ3(Q1‖Q0) +
1
|S|2
∑
j,`∈S:j 6=`
EQ̂n
(
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
Q1(Z`)−Q0(Z`)
Q0(Z`)
)
. (17)
Note that by (12), we have
EQ̂n
(
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
Q1(Z`)−Q0(Z`)
Q0(Z`)
)
= E 1
4
Q0Q0+
1
4
Q0Q1+
1
4
Q1Q0+
1
4
Q1Q1
(
Q1(Zj)−Q0(Zj)
Q0(Zj)
Q1(Z`)−Q0(Z`)
Q0(Z`)
)
(18)
=
1
4
(
EQ1
(
Q1(Z)−Q0(Z)
Q0(Z)
))2
=
1
4
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2. (19)
Therefore, combining (17) and (19), we obtain
VarQ̂n (T (Z)) = EQ̂n
(
T (Z)2
)− EQ̂n(T (Z))2 (20)
=
1
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
1
2 |S|χ3(Q1‖Q0) +
|S| (|S| − 1)
4 |S|2 χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2 − 1
4
χ2(Q1‖Q0)2 (21)
=
1
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
1
2 |S|χ3(Q1‖Q0)−
1
4 |S|χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2. (22)
Finally, to simplify the analysis, we choose a convenient threshold γ = 14χ2(Q1‖Q0). For the test T (z) defined
in (6) together with the threshold γ, the probability of false alarm α satisfies
α , PQ⊗n0 (T (Z) > γ) 6
VarQ⊗n0 (T (Z))
γ2
=
16
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0) . (23)
Similarly,
β = PQ̂n(T (Z) < γ) = PQ̂n(−T (Z) > −γ) (24)
= PQ̂n
(
EQ̂n(T (Z))− T (Z) >
1
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)− γ
)
(25)
6 PQ̂n
(∣∣∣EQ̂n(T (Z))− T (Z)∣∣∣ > 12χ2(Q1‖Q0)− γ
)
(26)
56
VarQ̂n (T (Z))
γ2
(27)
=
16
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0) +
8χ3(Q1‖Q0)
|S|χ2(Q1‖Q0)2 −
4
|S| . (28)
The result follows by recalling that |S| > k and β > 0.
Remark 1. Proposition 1 does not completely rule out the existence of covert linear codes for some fixed values
of (n, k) and such that D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ with 0 < δ. However, for 0 < δ 6 n4V(Q1, Q0)2, the codes would still be
subject to a square root law. Specifically, using the same notation as for the proof of Proposition 1, we have for
j ∈ J1,mK [16, Problem 3.25]∣∣{c` ∈ C : c`,ij = 1}∣∣ = ∣∣{c` ∈ C : c`,ij = 0}∣∣ = 2k−1. (29)
Consequently, the probability of having a non-zero symbol in a randomly chosen position and a randomly chosen
codeword, both chosen uniformly at random, is
µ , m2
k−1
n2k
=
m
2n
. (30)
Define the channel output distribution Q˜ as the average channel output distribution over all positions and all
codewords, i.e.,
Q˜(z) , 1
n
n∑
t=1
Q˜t(z) =
1
n2k
2k∑
`=1
n∑
t=1
WZ|X(z|c`t) = µQ1(z) + (1− µ)Q0(z). (31)
From the converse argument in [4], [5], we also know that if D(Q̂n‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ, we must have
δ
n
> D(Q˜‖Q0) > V(Q˜,Q0)2 = (µV(Q1, Q0))2 , (32)
where we have used Pinsker’s inequality. Therefore, we must have
µ 6 1
V(Q1, Q0)
√
δ
n
and m 6 2
V(Q1, Q0)
√
nδ, (33)
which is the “square-root law.” Note that (33), which is unlikely to be tight because of Pinsker’s inequality, is not
completely subsumed by the general converse [4], [5], which depends on the probability of decoding error.
As a corollary of Proposition 1, we have the following.
Corollary 1. A family of (n, kn) linear codes with (kn, n) ∈ (N∗)2 and kn 6 n, for which kn = ω(1) as n goes
to infinity cannot be covert. In particular, linear codes cannot achieve any fraction of the covert capacity.
Proof. Consider a family of (n, kn) codes with kn = ω(1), i.e., limn→∞ kn = ∞. By Proposition 1, there exists
a test for which α = O
(
1
kn
)
and β = O
(
1
kn
)
as n goes to infinity and the communication is detected with non
zero probability for n large enough. The result follows since achieving covert capacity would require kn = θ
√
nδ
for δ > D
(
Q̂n‖Q⊗n0
)
and some θ > 0 [4].
IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION USING MLC WITH PPM SYMBOLS
We now present our solution for covert communications over a BI-DMC using MLC and PPM. We consider
the scenario in which a transmitter (Alice) attempts to communicate over a BI-DMC with transition probability
WY |X with a legitimate receiver (Bob), while being eavesdropped by a warden (Willie) who obtains observations
of Alice’s transmission through another BI-DMC with transition probability WZ|X . By convention, channel input
“0” is the innocent symbol corresponding to the absence of communication. For j ∈ {0, 1} we set Pj , WY |X=j
and Qj , WZ|X=j . Alice encodes her messages W ∈ J1,MK into codewords X of n binary symbols, which are
observed by Bob and Willie as Y and Z, respectively. Alice’s encoding may be assisted by private randomness
S ∈ J1,KK shared only with Bob. Bob forms an estimate Ŵ of the transmitted message using Y and S. The
6objective for Alice is two-fold: (i) communicate reliably with Bob, measured by the average probability of error
P
(
W 6= Ŵ
)
; (ii) escape detection from the adversary, measured through the relative entropy D(PZ‖Q⊗n0 ) between
the distribution PZ induced by the coding scheme at Willie’s output and the “innocent” product distribution Q⊗n0 .
A code is said to achieve a covert throughput R with a covert key throughput RK , if as the block length increases
we have
lim
n→∞
logM√
nδ
> R, lim
n→∞
logK√
nδ
6 RK ,
lim
n→∞P
(
W 6= Ŵ
)
= 0, and lim
n→∞D(PZ‖Q
⊗n
0 ) 6 δ,
for some chosen δ > 0. The supremum of all achievable covert throughputs is called the covert capacity and has
been characterized in [4], [5] as
Ccovert =
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)D(P1‖P0), (34)
and the optimal key throughput is given by√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0) (D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0)) . (35)
A. Setup for MLC with PPM
Motivated by the negative result of Corollary 1, we consider here a non-linear scheme in which the non-linearity
is introduced through PPM as illustrated in Fig.1. The results in [14] show that PPM achieves the covert capacity
when combined with suitable random non-binary codes. One subtlety behind the results in [14] is that the PPM
order (and therefore the non-binary field size) grows linearly with the blocklength ` of the code used over the super
channel as
` =
⌈
2δ
χ2(Q1‖Q0)m
⌉
, (36)
making it hard to realize such codes in practice with low-complexity. Reed-Solomon (RS) codes offer the desired
scaling (they are q-ary code of length q − 1), but not the flexibility needed to meet the requirement in (36).
To circumvent the design of non-binary codes, we use MLC to decompose the PPM super-channel into q ∈ N∗
binary-input channels. Alice divides the message W into q messages (W1, . . . ,Wq) where Wi represents the input
message to the i-th level, which we will precisely define later. The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1, in which q binary
encoders feed their outputs to a PPM symbol mapper of order m , 2q. In the i-th level, the encoder encodes
message Wi into a binary vector Xi ∈ F`2. The PPM mapper takes these coded binary vectors from each level in
parallel and maps the binary vector of length q entering the mapper to a PPM symbol; we thus obtain a vector
of PPM symbols, X˜ ∈ X˜ `q at the output of the PPM mapper. Bob and Willie observe the outputs of channels
W˜Y˜ |X˜ and W˜Z˜|X˜ denoted by Y˜ ∈ Y˜`q and Z˜ ∈ Z˜`q , respectively. Let Q⊗m`0 denote the distribution induced when
DECODER
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BENCODER
...
ENCODER
ENCODER
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Xq
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W2
Wq
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 W Y |  X
 W  Z|  X
A X1
X2
 X
H0 : Q
 m 
0
K1:q
Fig. 1. Setup for MLC over PPM super channel.
7only innocent symbol “0” is sent through the channel WZ|X over m` channel uses, and PZ˜ denote the distribution
induced at Willie’s receiver by coding over ` super-channel uses. Before analyzing the coding scheme further, it is
worth noting that the benefits of MLC are not a priori obvious. In fact, since the number of levels changes with the
order of the PPM symbol m and the blocklength `, which are related by (36), one could expect that the channels
perceived at each level i ∈ J1, qK would vary as the blocklength grows, making code design particularly challenging.
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this is not the case and that codes may be designed for fixed channels; this is
particularly convenient as it allows us to exploit families of channel capacity- and channel resolvability-achieving
codes, such as polar codes [15], [17].
B. Information-theoretic analysis of MLC
We now present the information-theoretic analysis of MLC and show using random coding argument that there
exist binary coding schemes with MLC that achieve the covert capacity of BI-DMCs. We also later show in Section V
how to design an explicit low-complexity coding scheme by using MLC with multistage decoding (MSD). From
[5], we know that we only need a key to achieve covertness when D(P1||P0) < D(Q1||Q0). However, in MLC, we
are coding over multiple levels and the channel corresponding to individual levels may not hold the same relation.
Consequently, irrespective of the relationship between the original channels, we might need keys for some levels,
whereas we might be able to send some covert and secret messages over some other levels depending on the mutual
information relations between the two channels corresponding to that particular level. We can overcome this by
using chaining, which consists of breaking the transmission into several blocks and using the secret messages from
one block as the keys for the next block. By using chaining, we only require extra keys for the first block, and on
average the throughputs of messages and keys tend to the optimal throughputs as the number of blocks tends to
infinity. We prove this by first characterizing the size of keys and messages for a single block and then developing
a chaining strategy that achieves optimal throughput and covertness over B blocks.
We first describe the coding scheme for a single block. Let Wi = (Ui, Vi) with Ui ∈ J1,MU,iK and Vi ∈ J1,MV,iK
be a random variable that represents the message for the i-th level and Ki ∈ J1,MK,iK be the key shared between
Alice and Bob. Vi represents the secret part of the message, which is reused as a key for the next block. Ui, Vi,
and Ki are independent and uniformly distributed random variables. Let RU,i , log2MU,i, RV,i , log2MV,i, and
RK,i , log2MK,i represent the rates of Ui, Vi, and Ki, respectively. Encoders for each level are independent;
therefore, we can view the MLC scheme in Fig.1 as a q-user multiple-access channel (MAC) in which the PPM
mapper is integrated to the channel. Because of the symmetry of the PPM super channel, a uniform distribution
on PPM symbols achieves the capacity for Bob’s channel. Note that, to ensure (36) holds, the number of levels q
depends on the blocklength of the code `. Hence, we cannot directly use the results for MAC with a fixed number of
users. After careful analysis, we show that the result remains what would have expected from [18]. The codebook,
encoding, and decoding for one block are as follows.
• Codebook: For i-th level, generate a codebook of MU,i ×MV,i ×MK,i codewords, each of length `, denoted
by Xi(ui, vi, ki), where ui ∈ J1,MU,iK, vi ∈ J1,MV,iK, and ki ∈ J1,MK,iK. Each codeword is generated
independently according to a uniform distribution on X `, denoted by P ⊗`Xi .
• Encoding: Given messages Ui and Vi and key Ki for i-th level, the i-th encoder selects the codeword
Xi(Ui, Vi,Ki).
• Decoding: The receiver decodes wˆ = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆq, vˆ1, . . . , vˆq) from y˜ knowing the key k = (k1, . . . , kq) if wˆ
is the unique message such that (X1(uˆ1, vˆ1, k1), . . . ,Xq(uˆq, vˆq, kq), y˜) ∈ T `Γ , where T `Γ is defined as follows.
For Γ = {γS}S⊆J1,qK,
T `Γ ,
(x1, . . . ,xq, y˜) ∈ X ` × · · · × X ` × Y˜` : log W
⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|x1:q)
PY˜|XSc (y˜|xSc)
> γS , ∀S ⊆ J1, qK
 , (37)
where PY˜|XSc is the conditional distribution given by
PY˜|XSc (y˜|xSc) =
∑
xS
∏
j∈S
P ⊗`Xj (xj)W
⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|x1:q) (38)
8=
∏`
i=1
∑
xS,i
∏
j∈S
PXj (xj,i)WY˜ |X1:q (y˜i|x1:q,i) , (39)
=
∏`
i=1
PY˜ |XSc (y˜i|xSc,i) . (40)
To simplify the notation, we use the following definitions:
u , (u1, . . . , uq), v , (v1, . . . , vq), w , (u,v), (41)
X1:q(w,k) , X1:q(u,v,k) , (X1(u1, v1, k1), . . . ,Xq(uq, vq, kq)), (42)
X1:q,i(w,k) , X1:q,i(u,v,k) , (X1,i(u1, v1, k1), . . . , Xq,i(uq, vq, kq), (43)
XG(w,k) , (Xi(ui, vi, ki))i∈G , ∀G ⊆ J1, qK, (44)
MU ,MU,1 × · · · ×MU,q, (45)
MV ,MV,1 × · · · ×MV,q, (46)
MK ,MK,1 × · · · ×MK,q, (47)
M ,MU ×MV . (48)
We first analyze channel reliability and channel resolvability for one block and prove the existence of a random
code that satisfies the requirements. Then, we use chaining over blocks using the same code for each block to
obtain a coding scheme that achieves optimal rate. For chaining over B blocks, the variables in the j-th block
is identified by a superscript; for example, we denote the message vector by w(j), the key vector by k(j), the
corresponding codeword for the i-th level by xi(w(j),k(j)) , xi(w(j)i , k
(j)
i ), and the outputs of Bob’s channel and
Willie’s channel by y˜(j) and z˜(j) respectively.
1) Reliability Analysis: We now analyze the rate requirements for achieving vanishing probability of error using
random codes for a single block. We denote the probability of error for a given codebook by P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)
and the
expectation of it over the random codebook distribution by E
[
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)]
. The following lemma summarizes
the requirement.
Lemma 1. For S ⊆ J1, qK and 0 <  < ε/2, if the rates of random codes satisfy∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RV,i) 6 I(XS ; Y˜ |XSc)− ε
q
, (49)
then
E
[
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)]
6 δ1 , m
(
e−
2`2
q4 + 2−
`
q
)
. (50)
Proof. The probability of error averaged over the codebook distribution is given by
E
[
P
(
Ŵ 6= W|K = k
)]
= E
∑
y˜
∑
w
1
M
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(w,k))
1
{
(X1:q(w,k), y˜) /∈ T `Γ or ∃w′ 6= w s.t.
(
X1:q(w
′,k), y˜
) ∈ T `Γ}
 (51)
= E
∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))
1
{
(X1:q(1,k), y˜) /∈ T `Γ or ∃w 6= 1 s.t. (X1:q(w,k), y˜) ∈ T `Γ
} (52)
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∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))1
{
(X1:q(1,k), y˜) /∈ T `Γ
}+
∑
w 6=1
E
∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))1
{
(X1:q(w,k), y˜) ∈ T `Γ
} (53)
6
∑
S⊆J1,qKPW˜ ⊗`Y˜ |X1:q
∏q
i=1 P
⊗`
Xi
log W˜ ⊗`Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜ `|X1:q(1,k)
)
PY˜|XSc
(
Y˜ `|XSc(1,k)
) 6 γS
+
∑
w 6=1
E
∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))1
{
(X1:q(w,k), y˜) ∈ T `Γ
} . (54)
We first analyze the first term on the right hand side of (54). We have
log
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜|X1:q(1,k)
)
PY˜|XSc
(
Y˜|XSc(1,k)
) = ∑`
i=1
log
W˜Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜i|X1:q,i(1,k)
)
PY˜ |XSc
(
Y˜i|XSc,i(1,k)
) . (55)
Let
Ai = log
W˜Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜i|X1:q,i(1,k)
)
PY˜ |XSc
(
Y˜i|XSc,i(1,k)
) . (56)
We have
E [Ai] = I(XS ; Y˜ |XSc). (57)
We now show that Ai is bounded. For any S ⊆ J1, qK,
PY˜ |XSc
(
Y˜i|XSc,i(1,k)
)
=
1
2|S|
∑
xS
W˜Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜i|xS , XSc,i(1,k)
)
(58)
> 1
2|S|
W˜Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜i|XS,i(1,k), XSc,i(1,k)
)
. (59)
Therefore,
Ai 6 |S| 6 q. (60)
Also,
W˜Y˜ |X1:q
(
Y˜i|X1:q,i(1,k)
)
PY˜ |XSc
(
Y˜i|XSc,i(1,k)
) = P1(Yi,Aq(X1:q,i(1,k)))∏h′ 6=Aq(X1:q,i(1,k)) P0(Yi,h′)1
2|S|
∑
j∈Aq(XSc,i(1,k)) P1(Yi,j)
∏
h6=j P0(Yi,h)
(61)
=
P1(Yi,j′ )
P0(Yi,j′ )
1
2|S|
∑
j∈Aq(XSc,i(1,k))
P1(Yi,j)
P0(Yi,j)
(62)
> P1(Yi,j
′)
1
2|S|
∑
j∈Aq(XSc,i(1,k))
1
P0(Yi,j)
(63)
> µ11
2|S|
∑
j∈Aq(XSc,i(1,k))
1
µ0
(64)
> µ0µ1, (65)
where
µ0 = min
y∈supp(P0)
P0(y), µ1 = min
y∈supp(P1)
P1(y).
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From (60) and (65), we have
log(µ0µ1) 6 Ai 6 q =⇒ |Ai| 6 max
(
log
1
µ0µ1
, q
)
. (66)
By choosing γ`S = `
(
I(XS ; Y˜ |XSc)− /q
)
and using Hoeffding’s inequality, for large enough q, we have
P
log W˜ ⊗`Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|x1, . . . ,xq)
PY˜|XSc (y˜|xSc)
6 γS
 6 e− 2`2q4 . (67)
We now analyze the second term in (54). For any w 6= 1, we let G ⊂ J1, qK denote the set of levels j for which
wj = (uj , vj) = 1. Then, we have
E
∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))1
{
(X1:q(w,k), y˜) ∈ T `Γ
}
=
∑
y˜
∑
{xj(1,kj)}j∈G
∏
j∈G
PXj (xj(1, kj))
∑
{xj′ (1,kj′ ),xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gc
∏
j′∈Gc
PXj′ (xj′(1, kj′))PXj′ (xj′(wj′ , kj′))
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|x1:q(1,k))1
{
(xG(1,k),xGc(w,k)) ∈ T `Γ
}
(68)
=
∑
y˜
∑
{xj(1,kj)}j∈G
∏
j∈G
PXj (xj(1, kj))
∑
{xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gc
∏
j′∈Gc
PXj′ (xj′(wj′ , kj′))
PY˜|XG (y˜|xG(1,k))1
{
(xG(1,k),xGc(w,k)) ∈ T `Γ
}
(69)
(a)
6 2−γGc
∑
y˜
∑
{xj(1,kj)}j∈G
∏
j∈G
PXj (xj(1, kj))∑
{xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gc
∏
j′∈Gc
PXj′ (xj′(wj′ , kj′))W˜
⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|xG(1,k),xGc(wGc ,k)) (70)
= 2−γGc , (71)
where (a) follows since PY˜|XG (y˜|xG(1,k)) 6 2−γGcW˜ ⊗`Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|xG(1,k),xGc(w,k)) for (xG(1,k),xGc(w,k)) ∈
T `Γ and upper bounding the indicator function by 1.
Hence,
∑
w 6=1
E
∑
y˜
W˜ ⊗`
Y˜ |X1:q (y˜|X1:q(1,k))1
{
(X1:q(w,k), y˜) ∈ T `Γ
} (72)
6
∑
G⊂J1,qK
∏
i∈Gc
(MU,iMV,i − 1)2−γGc (73)
=
∑
G⊂J1,qK
∏
i∈Gc
(MU,iMV,i − 1)2−γGc (74)
6
∑
G⊂J1,qK 2
−γGc ∏
i∈Gc
MU,iMV,i. (75)
Therefore, from (54), (67), and (75), we get
E
[
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)]
6
∑
S⊆J1,qK e
− 2`2
q4 +
∑
G⊂J1,qK 2
−γGc ∏
i∈Gc
MU,iMV,i (76)
=
∑
S⊆J1,qK e
− 2`2
q4 +
∑
G⊂J1,qK 2
−`
(
I(XGc ;Y˜ |XG)− q−
∑
i∈Gc (RU,i+RV,i)
)
(77)
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(a)
6
∑
S⊆J1,qK e
− 2`2
q4 +
∑
G⊂J1,qK 2
− `(ε−)
q (78)
(b)
< m
(
e−
2`2
q4 + 2−
`
q
)
, (79)
where (a) follows from choosing
∑
i∈Gc(RU,i + RV,i) 6 I(XGc ; Y˜ |XG)− ε/q and (b) follows by upper bounding
the number of subsets of J1, qK and by choosing ε > 2.
For G ⊂ J1, qK, let i ∈ G. Then, we have
I(XGc ; Y˜ |XG) = I(XGc\{i}; Y˜ |XG) + I(Xi; Y˜ |XJ1,qK\{i}) > I(Xi; Y˜ |XJ1,qK\{i}). (80)
Because Xi’s are independent and uniformly distributed, the quantity I(Xi; Y˜ |XJ1,qK\{i}) is same for all i. Note
that given the realizations of XJ1,qK\{i} = xJ1,qK\{i}, the position of symbol “1” in the PPM symbol x˜(Xi, xJ1,qK\{i})
is given by one of the two positions indexed by Aq(xJ1,qK\{i}). Therefore, I(Xi; Y˜ |XJ1,qK\{i}) is equivalent to the
mutual information between the input and outputs when using PPM symbols of order 2 in the MLC-PPM scheme,
and using [14, Eq.(13)], we obtain
I(Xi; Y˜ |XJ1,qK\{i}) = D (P1‖P0)− D (P 2PPM‖P ⊗20 ) , (81)
where P 2PPM represents the output distribution of Bob’s channel when the input is uniform over PPM symbols of
order 2. Hence, we can find rates satisfying
∑
i∈Gc(RU,i + RV,i) 6 I(XGc ; Y˜ |XG) − ε/q for ε/q < D (P1‖P0) −
D
(
P 2PPM‖P ⊗20
)
for all G ⊂ J1, qK.
2) Covertness Analysis: We now analyze the channel resolvability of Willie’s channel and prove the existence
of channel resolvability codes if the rates satisfy some condition. Let PZ˜ be the distribution induced by the code
for a given block, QmPPM be the output distribution of Willie’s channel when the input is uniform over all possible
PPM symbols of order m ,and Q⊗m`0 be the innocent distribution. By calculations similar to [5, (77)-(79)], we have
D
(
PZ˜‖Q⊗m`0
)
6 D
(
PZ˜‖(QmPPM)⊗`
)
+ 2V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
max
z˜
`
∣∣∣∣log (QmPPM)(z˜)Q⊗m0 (z˜)
∣∣∣∣+ D((QmPPM)⊗`‖Q⊗m`0 ). (82)
We show using the following lemma that the first two terms go to zero exponentially in `.
Lemma 2. For S ⊆ J1, qK and 0 <  < ε/2, if the rates of random codes satisfy∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RK,i) > I(XS ; Z˜) +
ε
q
, (83)
then
E
[
D
(
PZ˜|V=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)]
6 δ2 , m2−`/q +
m2`2q/m`
µz
e−
2`2
q4 , (84)
where µz = minz∈supp(QZ)QZ(z) with QZ(z) =
1
2
∑
x∈X WZ|X(z|x).
Lemma 2 actually proves a stronger result that what we need to bound (82), as it guarantees that, on average over
all possible values of the message v, the distribution induced by coding remains identical regardless of the values
of v. This stronger result will prove useful in Section IV-B5 when we integrate the code in a chained construction.
Proof. We denote QmPPM by QZ˜ and (Q
m
PPM)
⊗` by QZ˜. We have
QZ˜(z˜) =
1
2q
Q2
q
0 (z˜)
2q∑
j=1
Q1(zj)
Q0(zj)
, (85)
QZ˜(z˜) =
1
2q`
∏`
i=1
Q2
q
0 (z˜i)
2q∑
j=1
Q1(zi,j)
Q0(zi,j)
, (86)
QZ˜|XS (z˜|xS) =
1
2|Sc|`
∏`
i=1
Q2
q
0 (z˜i)
∑
j∈A(xS,i)
Q1(zi,j)
Q0(zi,j)
. (87)
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We define a typical set as follows:
T ` (X1:q, Z˜) ,
{
(x1, . . . ,xq, z˜) ∈ X ` × · · · × X ` × Z˜` : 1
`
log
Q (z˜|xS)
Q (z˜)
< I(XS ; Z˜) +

q
, ∀S ⊆ J1, qK} . (88)
We denote the expectation over all the random variables except X1:q(u,v,k) by E∼X1:q(u,v,k). Then, the expectation
of relative entropy over the codebook distribution is
E
[
D
(
PZ˜|V=v‖QZ˜
)]
= E
∑
z˜
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u,v,k))
log
∑u′,k′ W˜Z˜|X1:q (z˜|X1:q(u′,v,k′))
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
 (89)
=
∑
z˜
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
EX1:q(u,v,k)
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u,v,k))
E∼X1:q(u,v,k)
log
∑u′,k′ W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u′,v,k′))
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
 (90)
(a)
6
∑
z˜
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
EX1:q(u,v,k)
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u,v,k))
log
∑u′,k′ E∼X1:q(u,v,k)
[
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u′,v,k′))
]
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
 (91)
(b)
=
∑
z˜
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
EX1:q(u,v,k)
[
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u,v,k))
log
(∑
S⊆J1,qK∏i∈S(MU,iMK,i − 1)QZ˜|XSc (z˜|XSc(u,v,k))
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
)]
(92)
6
∑
z˜
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
EX1:q(u,v,k)
[
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u,v,k))
log
(
1 +
∑
S⊂J1,qK∏i∈S(MU,iMK,i − 1)QZ˜|XSc (z˜|XSc(u,v,k))
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
)]
(93)
=
1
MUMK
∑
u,k
∑
z˜
∑
x1:q
1
2q`
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|x1:q)
log
(
1 +
∑
S⊂J1,qK∏i∈S(MU,iMK,i − 1)QZ˜|XSc (z˜|xSc)
MUMKQZ˜(z˜)
)
(94)
(c)
6
∑
(x1:q,z˜)∈T ` (X1:q,Z˜)
1
2q`
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|x1:q) log
1 + ∑
S⊂J1,qK 2
−`(∑i∈Sc (RU,i+RK,i)−I(XSc ;Z˜)−/q)

+
∑
(x1:q,z˜)/∈T ` (X1:q,Z˜)
1
2q`
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|x1:q) log
(
1 + 2qµ−m`z
)
(95)
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(d)
6
∑
(x1:q,z˜)∈T ` (X1:q,Z˜)
1
2q`
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|x1:q)
∑
S⊂J1,qK 2
−`(∑i∈Sc (RU,i+RK,i)−I(XSc ;Z˜)−/q)
+
∑
(x1:q,z˜)/∈T ` (X1:q,Z˜)
1
2q`
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|x1:q)
m`2q/m`
µz
(96)
6
∑
S⊂J1,qK 2
−`(∑i∈S(RU,i+RK,i)−I(XS ;Z˜)−/q) + m`2q/m`
µz
P
(
(X1:q, Z˜) /∈ T ` (X1:q, Z˜)
)
(97)
(e)
6 m2−`(ε−)/q + m`2
q/m`
µz
P
(
(X1:q, Z˜) /∈ T ` (X1:q, Z˜)
)
, (98)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, (b) follows from expressing the summation over all (u′,k′) as a
summation over S ∈ J1, qK and (u′,k′) ∈ {(u′′,k′′) : (u′′j , k′′j ) = (uj , kj)∀j ∈ Sc and (u′′j , k′′j ) = (uj , kj)∀j ∈ S}
and noting that E∼X1:q(u,v,k)
[
W˜Z˜|X1:q(z˜|X1:q(u′,v,k′))
]
= QZ˜|XSc (z˜|XSc(u,v,k)) for all (u′,k′) in that set, (c)
follows because for (x1:q, z˜) ∈ T ` (X1:q, Z˜) and S ⊆ J1, qK, QZ˜|XSc (z˜|xSc )QZ˜(z˜) 6 2`(I(XSc ;Z˜)+/q), (d) follows because
log(1 + xm) 6 mx for x > 0, and (e) follows because
∑
i∈S(RU,i +RK,i) > I(XS ; Z˜) + ε/q.
Using Hoeffding’s inequality as in the previous section, we can show that
P
(
(X1:q, Z˜) /∈ T ` (X1:q, Z˜)
)
6 me−
2`2
q4 . (99)
Therefore, for 0 <  < ε/2, we have
E
[
D
(
PZ˜|V=v‖QZ˜
)]
6 m2−`/q + m
2`2q/m`
µz
e−
2`2
q4 . (100)
3) Identifying a specific code: We now show that there exists a specific code that has small probability of error
and divergence between the induced distribution and the innocent distribution close to the desired value. We denote
the probability measure w.r.t. codebook distribution by PC(·). By using Markov’s inequality, for α > 0 and β > 0,
we have
PC
(
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)
< αδ1,
∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜(j)|V(j)=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
< βδ2
)
= 1− PC
(
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)
> αδ1 or
∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜(j)|V(j)=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
> βδ2
)
(101)
> 1− PC
(
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)
> αδ1
)
− PC
(∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜(j)|V(j)=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
> βδ2
)
(102)
> 1− 1
α
− 1
β
. (103)
By choosing α and β such that 1α +
1
β < 1, we have the above probability positive, which means there exist codes
that satisfy
P
(
Ŵ 6= W
)
< αδ1, (104)∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜(j)|V(j)=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
< βδ2. (105)
Moreover, because of the convexity of divergence,
D
(
PZ˜‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
6
∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜(j)|V(j)=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
< βδ2. (106)
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This implies that the first two terms of (82) goes to zero exponentially in `. Using [14, Lemma 1], we have
D
(
(QmPPM)
⊗`‖Q⊗m`0
)
6 `
m
(
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
2
+O( 1
m
)
)
. (107)
By choosing ` = b 2mδBχ2(Q1‖Q0)c,
D
(
(QmPPM)
⊗`‖Q⊗m`0
)
6 δ
B
+O( 1
Bm
). (108)
Hence, we have
D
(
PZ˜‖Q⊗m`0
)
6 δ
B
+O( 1
Bm
). (109)
From (105), we show the secrecy of V as follows.
I
(
Z˜; V
)
= D
(
PZ˜V‖PZ˜PV
)
(110)
=
∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜|V=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
− D
(
PZ˜‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
(111)
6
∑
v
1
MV
D
(
PZ˜|V=v‖ (QmPPM)
⊗`
)
(112)
6βδ2. (113)
4) MSD operating point for MLC: We know from [14] that the capacity of the PPM super channel converges
to D(P1‖P0) as the PPM order m tends to infinity. Since the PPM mapper is a one-to-one map between X1:q and
the PPM symbol X˜ = x˜(X1:q), we have the following decomposition of mutual information between the input and
the output of the PPM super channel W˜Y˜ |X˜ .
I(X˜; Y˜ ) = I(X1:q; Y˜ ) =
q∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q). (114)
The mutual information term I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) represents the average mutual information between the input of the
i-th level and Y˜ for a given input to the levels i+ 1 to q. Since, Xi is independent of Xi+1:q, we have
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Y˜ , Xi+1:q). (115)
This suggests that we can consider the i-th level as a channel with input Xi and output (Y˜ , Xi+1:q) and decode all
levels successively in descending order from q to 1 using MSD; specifically, we decode the q-th level first, then the
(q−1)-th level by treating the decoded bits from q-th level as a side information for the channel defining (q−1)-th
level, and so on. From [19], we know that the capacity of the PPM super channel could be achieved using MSD
by choosing the corresponding terms in the summation of (114) as the rates for each level. In our problem, we
show that by choosing the rates for i-th level as follows, we can achieve the optimal rate.
RU,i = min
(
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− ε/q, I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) + ε/q
)
, (116)
RV,i = max
(
0, I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− 2ε/q
)
, (117)
RK,i = max
(
0, I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
)
. (118)
The sum in (114) converges to D(P1‖P0) as q tends to infinity. This suggests that we can achieve rates arbitrarily
close to D(P1‖P0) by choosing the number of levels in MLC large enough and rates given in (116-118) for each
level.
We now show that the rates in (116-118) satisfy the rate requirements in (49) and (83). For S ⊆ J1, qK, we have∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RV,i) =
∑
i∈S
(
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− ε/q
)
(119)
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=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Y˜ |XJi+1,qK∩S , XJi+1,qK∩Sc)− |S|ε/q (120)
=
∑
i∈S
(
H(Xi|XJi+1,qK∩S , XJi+1,qK∩Sc)−H(Xi|Y˜ , XJi+1,qK∩S , XJi+1,qK∩Sc))− |S|ε/q (121)
(a)
6
∑
i∈S
(
H(Xi|XJi+1,qK∩S , XSc)−H(Xi|Y˜ , XJi+1,qK∩S , XSc))− |S|ε/q (122)
= I(XS , Y˜ |XSc)− |S|ε/q, (123)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the Xi’s are independent of each other.
Hence, the rates satisfy the constraints for reliability. Similarly,∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RK,i) =
∑
i∈S
(
I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) + ε/q
)
(124)
=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜|{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S , {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S) + |S|ε/q (125)
=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S)
− I(Xi; {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|ε/q (126)
(a)
=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|ε/q (127)
>
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜|{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|ε/q (128)
= I(XS ; Z˜) + |S|ε/q, (129)
where (a) follows from the independence of {Xi}. This shows that the rates satisfy the resolvability rate constraints.
We now compute the covert message and key throughputs. The number of bits transmitted is given by
logMU + logMV = `
q∑
i=1
(RU,i +RV,i) (130)
= `
(
I(X1:q; Y˜ )− ε
)
(131)
= `
(
I(X˜; Y˜ )− ε
)
(132)
> `
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
, (133)
where the last inequality follows from [14, Lemma 2]. The covert message throughput is given by
logMU + logMV√
`mδ/B
>
√
B`
mδ
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
(134)
=
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
. (135)
The number of key bits used is given by
logMK = `
q∑
i=1
RK,i (136)
6 `
q∑
i=1
max
(
0, I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
)
, (137)
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and the covert key throughput is given by
logMK√
`mδ/B
6
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
q∑
i=1
max
(
0, I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
))
. (138)
We now show using an example that the above key rate is not optimal. Let Bob’s channel be a BSC with
probability of flipping P0(1) = P1(0) = 0.2 and Willie’s channel be a binary asymmetric channel (BAC) with
probability of flipping Q0(1) = 0.1 and Q1(0) = 0.4. The relative entropies for these channels are D(P1‖P0) = 1.2
and D(Q1‖Q0) = 1.083. For this case, ideally we do not need any key to achieve covert communication, but from
the computation of I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) − I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) for q = 10 levels shown in Table I, we can conclude that
we need some key bits.
TABLE I
I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) COMPUTED FOR 10 LEVELS FOR THE GIVEN CHANNELS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0.0905 -0.0452 -0.0084 0.0077 0.0084 0.0052 0.0028 0.0014 0.0007 0.0004
Note that for the first 3 levels, I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) − I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) is negative. This suggests that we can send
some secret bits over the first 3 levels as RV,i is positive for those levels. Moreover, the absolute value of sum of
negative terms is greater than the sum of positive terms. This means that we can use chaining so that the secret
messages from one block can be used as the keys for the next block.
5) Chaining over B blocks: We now show that modifying the coding scheme by chaining over B blocks such that
the secret messages from i-th block {V (i)j }j∈J1,qK are used as the keys for (i+ 1)-th block {K(i+1)j }j∈J1,qK, we can
achieve the optimal throughputs. We can aggregate the secret messages from the levels that support secret messages
and distribute them across the levels for which we need a key. We first show that the probability of error goes to
zero asymptotically. To bound the probability of error for B blocks with chaining, define E(i) = {Ŵ(i) 6= W(i)}
and E(1:B) = ⋃Bi=1 E(i), where W(i) is the transmitted message and Ŵ(i) is the decoded message at the receiver
for the i-th block. Following similar steps as in the proof of [11, Lemma 8], we obtain
P
(
E(1:B)
)
6
B∑
i=1
P
(
E(i)
∣∣∣E(i−1)c) (139)
6 Bm
(
e
− 2`2
(logm)2 + 2−`(ε−)
)
. (140)
This shows that the probability of error goes to zero asymptotically.
We now show that the relative entropy between the induced and innocent distributions is upper bounded by δ
asymptotically. Let PZ˜(1:B) be the distribution induced by the coding scheme for B blocks. We want PZ˜(1:B) to be
close to the innocent distribution Q⊗Bm`0 . We have
D
(
PZ˜(1:B)‖Q⊗Bm`0
)
=
B∑
j=1
EZ˜(j+1:B)
[
D
(
PZ˜(j)|Z˜(j+1:B)‖Q⊗m`0
)]
(141)
=
B∑
j=1
[
D
(
PZ˜(j)‖Q⊗m`0
)
+ EZ˜(j+1:B)
[
D
(
PZ˜(j)|Z˜(j+1:B)‖PZ˜(j)
)]]
(142)
=
B∑
j=1
[
D
(
PZ˜(j)‖Q⊗m`0
)
+ I(Z˜(j); Z˜(j+1:B))
]
, (143)
and
I(Z˜(j); Z˜(j+1:B)) 6 I(Z˜(j); Z˜(j+1:B),V(j)) (144)
= I(Z˜(j); V(j)) + I(Z˜(j); Z˜(j+1:B)|V(j)) (145)
(a)
= I(Z˜(j); V(j)), (146)
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where (a) is because of the Markov chain Z˜(j) → V(j) → Z˜(j+1:B). By similar steps as in (110)-(113), we can
show that
I
(
Z˜(j); V(j)
)
6 βδ2. (147)
Therefore,
D
(
PZ˜(1:B)‖Q⊗Bm`0
)
6 δ +O( 1
m
). (148)
We now show that the covert message and key throughputs are close to the covert capacity. The number of
transmitted bits is given by
B (logMU + logMV ) > B`
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
(149)
Hence, the covert rate is given by
B (logMU + logMV )√
B`mδ
>
√
B`
mδ
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
(150)
=
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
D(P1‖P0)− 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0)− ε
)
. (151)
The number of key bits used is given by
logMK + (B − 1)(logMK − logMV )+
= `
q∑
i=1
RK,i + (B − 1)`
(
q∑
i=1
(RK,i −RV,i)
)+
(152)
6 `
q∑
i=1
I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) + (B − 1)`
(
q∑
i=1
(
I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
))+
(153)
= `I(X˜; Z˜) + (B − 1)`
(
I(X˜; Z˜)− I(X˜; Y˜ ) + 2ε
)+
(154)
6 `D(Q1‖Q0) + (B − 1)`
(
D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0) + 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0) + 2ε
)+
(155)
Therefore, the key throughput is
logMK + (B − 1)(logMK − logMV )+√
B`mδ
6
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
(
D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0) + 1
m
χ2(P1‖P0) + 2ε
)+
+
√
2
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
D(Q1‖Q0)
B
, (156)
and the last term vanishes for large B.
6) Degraded case: We now show that when Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel, we do not require
any chaining and any key. We show that using following proposition.
Proposition 2. The MLC rates
RU,i = I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− ε/q, RV,i = 0, RK,i = 0 (157)
satisfy both reliability and resolvability constraints when Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel.
Proof. Using the same arguments as for the general case, we can show that for any S ⊆ J1, qK,∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RV,i) 6 I(XS , Y˜ |XSc)− |S|ε/q. (158)
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Hence, the rates satisfy the constraints for reliability given in (49).
When Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel, we have
WZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y
WY |X(y|x)WZ|Y (z|y). (159)
The transition probability of the super channel is given by
W˜Z˜|X˜(z˜|x˜) =
m∏
j=1
W (zj |xj) (160)
=
m∏
j=1
∑
yj
W (yj |xj)W (zj |yj) (161)
=
∑
y˜∈Y˜
m∏
j=1
W (yj |xj)W (zj |yj) (162)
=
∑
y˜∈Y˜
W˜ (y˜|x˜)W˜ (z˜|y˜). (163)
Hence, the super channel corresponding to Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. the super channel corresponding to
Bob’s channel.
The channel corresponding to the i-th level of MLC for Willie’s channel is given by:
WZ˜,Xi+1:q|Xi(z˜, xi+1:q|xi) =
∑
x1:i−1 P
⊗q
X (x1:q)W˜Z˜|X˜(z˜|x˜(x1:q))
PX(xi)
(164)
=
∑
x1:i−1 P
⊗q
X (x1:q)
∑
y˜∈Y˜ W˜ (y˜|x˜(x1:q))W˜ (z˜|y˜)
PX(xi)
(165)
=
∑
y˜∈Y˜
W˜ (z˜|y˜)
∑
x1:i−1 P
⊗q
X (x1:q)W˜ (y˜|x˜(x1:q))
PX(xi)
(166)
=
∑
y˜∈Y˜
W˜ (z˜|y˜)WY˜ ,Xi+1:q|Xi(y˜, xi+1:q|xi). (167)
This shows that the channels corresponding to each levels of MLC for Willie’s channel are degraded w.r.t. those
of Bob’s channel. Hence, we have
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Y˜ , Xi+1:q) > I(Xi; Z˜,Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q). (168)
We choose ε such that I(Xi; Y˜ , Xi+1:q)− ε/q > I(Xi; Z˜,Xi+1:q) + ε/q. Then, for every S ⊆ J1, qK, we can bound
the sum-rates as follows:∑
i∈S
(RU,i +RK,i) =
∑
i∈S
(
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− ε
q
)
(169)
>
∑
i∈S
(
I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) + ε
q
)
(170)
=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜|{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S , {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S) + |S|εq (171)
=
∑
i∈S
(
I(Xi; Z˜, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S)
− I(Xi; {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S)
)
+
|S|ε
q
(172)
(a)
=
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|εq (173)
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>
∑
i∈S
I(Xi; Z˜|{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|εq (174)
= I(XS ; Z˜) +
|S|ε
q
, (175)
where (a) follows from the independence of {Xi}. This shows that the MLC rates in (157) satisfy the resolvability
rate constraints given in (83).
Since we are not using any key, we do not need chaining to achieve optimal rates. Fig.2 shows an illustration
of the rate region of MLC with two levels for a degraded case.
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Fig. 2. Rate region for MLC with two levels with MSD operating point
V. TOWARDS PRACTICAL CODES
In this section, we discuss the design of practical codes for covert communication over a BI-DMC using MLC.
The code design, in general, involves using keys and chaining over multiple blocks. To simplify the analysis, we
discuss code design for the degraded case. We can generalize the code design for non-degraded cases using a
chaining scheme as explained in the previous section. First, we show that the equivalent channel corresponding to
a particular level when using MSD remains unchanged when we alter the number of levels, which tremendously
simplifies the code design. After establishing additional properties of the equivalent channels, we analyze the
probability of error at Bob’s decoder and covertness at Willie’s receiver. Towards the end of this section, we will
discuss an explicit low-complexity code construction using polar codes.
A. Equivalent channel for each level
We now prove that the channel corresponding to each level of MLC with MSD for uniformly distributed inputs
can be represented by an equivalent channel that does not depend on the number of levels used in the scheme.
In Section IV-B, we established that we can consider the i-th channel as a channel with input Xi and output
(Y˜ , Xi+1:q). Because of the structure of PPM, for a known input to the levels i + 1 to q, xi+1:q, the position
of the symbol “1” in the PPM symbol can be narrowed down to 2i positions. Using the notation defined earlier,
Aq(xi+1:q) denotes the set of indices of those positions. According to the PPM mapper defined in Section II, the
position of the symbol “1” is in the first half of the PPM symbol if xq = 0 and in the second half otherwise.
Similarly, if xi = 0, the position of the symbol “1” is in the first half of the subset of indices determined by the
values of (xi+1, . . . , xq) and second half otherwise. Table II shows an illustration of this mapping for m = 16.
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TABLE II
ILLUSTRATION OF PPM MAPPER FOR m = 16
PPM symbol index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
x1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
x2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
x3 0 1 0 1
x4 0 1
The set Aq(xi+1:q) also defines the indices for the aforementioned PPM symbols because of the indexing defined
earlier. To estimate the i-th bit, we have to consider only the outputs at the positions with indices in Aq(xi+1:q).
Assuming that the inputs to levels 1 to i− 1 are uniformly distributed, we can express the effective channel as
W i(y˜Aq(xi+1:q)|xi) =
1
2i−1
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
∑
y˜J1,2qK\Aq(xi+1:q)
W ⊗2
q
(y˜|x˜(x1:q)) (176)
=
1
2i−1
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
P ⊗2
i−1
0
(
y˜Aq(xi+1:q)\Aq(x1:q)
)
P1(y˜Aq(x1:q)). (177)
Since the channel is memoryless, once the decoder selects the 2i positions indexed by Aq(xi+1:q), the distribution
of the selected output symbols is independent of the input to the levels i + 1 to q. Hence, we can represent the
above channel equivalently by
W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi) = 1
2i−1
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
P ⊗2
i
0 (y1, . . . , y2i)
P1(yAi(x1:i))
P0(yAi(x1:i))
(178)
=
1
2i−1
∑
k∈Ai(xi)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y1, . . . , y2i)
P1(yk)
P0(yk)
(179)
=
1
2i−1
2i−1(1+xi)∑
j=2i−1xi+1
P ⊗2
i
0 (y1, . . . , y2i)
P1(yj)
P0(yj)
. (180)
The crucial aspect of this characterization is showing that this channel remains unchanged irrespective of the number
of levels q used. Note that the above channel is equivalent to the i-th channel in an MLC with i levels. Since the
i-th level channel is constant, we know that its capacity is fixed, and we can characterize it more precisely as
follows.
Lemma 3. For i ∈ J1, qK, the capacity Ci of the i-th level satisfies
Ci 6
1
2i
χ2(P1‖P0)− 1
22i−1
[
θ(P1‖P0)− χ2(P1‖P0)− 2χ2(P1‖P0)3
]
+
1
3× 23(i−1) [ρ(P1‖P0)− 3χ2(P1‖P0)] . (181)
where
θ(P1‖P0) ,
∑
y
P1(y)
(
P1(y)− P0(y)
P0(y)
)2
,
ρ(P1‖P0) ,
∑
y
P1(y)
(
P1(y)− P0(y)
P0(y)
)3
.
Proof. The capacity of the i-th level is I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) with Xj for j ∈ J1, qK distributed uniformly in {0, 1}.
Since Xi is independent of Xi+1:q, we have
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Y˜ , Xi+1:q) (182)
= I(X1:i; Y˜ , Xi+1:q)− I(X1:i−1; Y˜ , Xi:q) (183)
= I(X1:i; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− I(X1:i−1; Y˜ |Xi:q). (184)
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Similar to the argument used for the equivalent channel of each level, the quantity I(X1:i; Y˜ , Xi+1:q) is equivalent
to I(X1:i; Y˜Aq(Xi+1:q)), which represents the capacity of a PPM channel of order 2
i. Using [14, Eq.(13)], we obtain
I(X1, . . . , Xi;Y1, . . . , Y2i) = D(P1‖P0)− D
(
P 2
i
PPM‖P ⊗2
i
0
)
, (185)
where P 2
i
PPM represents the output distribution when the input is uniform over all possible PPM symbols of order
2i. Hence, we have
Ci = I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) = D
(
P 2
i−1
PPM ‖P ⊗2
i−1
0
)
− D
(
P 2
i
PPM‖P ⊗2
i
0
)
(186)
Upper bounding the right-hand side using [14, Lemma 1] yields the desired result.
Note that, for higher levels, the capacity Ci goes to zero exponentially in the index of the level. Since the sum
of the capacities converges to D(P1‖P0) by [14, Lemma 2] and by the capacity-achieving property of MLC with
MSD [19], very few levels concentrate most of the capacity. As an example, Table III shows the capacity per
level of first 16 levels for a binary symmetric channel with cross-over probability 0.1. Notice that the first 5 levels
concentrate 93.4% of the total capacity.
TABLE III
CAPACITY OF FIRST 16 LEVELS FOR A BINARY SYMMETRIC CHANNEL WITH CROSS-OVER PROBABILITY 0.1
Level, i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Capacity, Ci 0.7421 0.6387 0.4918 0.3214 0.1749 0.0853 0.0413 0.0203
Level, i 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Capacity, Ci 0.0101 0.0050 0.0025 0.0013 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
We state and prove some of the properties of equivalent channels in the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. The equivalent channel defined in (180) is symmetric.
Proof. The equivalent channel W i has the following property:
W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi) = W i(y2i−1+1, . . . , y2i , y1, . . . , y2i−1 |xi ⊕ 1). (187)
Therefore, the equivalent channel is symmetric.
Definition 1. Let Pi represent the set of all permutations of J1, 2iK. We define the set Πi as
Πi ,
{
σ ∈ Pi : ∀i ∈ J1, 2i−1K, σ(i) ∈ J1, 2i−1K} .
Let Π`i represent the set of permutations of a vector of length `, whose components are vectors of length 2
i, such
that each component is permuted by one element of Πi.
Note that for pi ∈ Π`i and y˜ ∈ Y˜`i , pi(y˜) is a permutation of y˜ such that the components of each y˜j ∈ Y2
i
are
permuted in such a way that the components in the first half remain in the first half.
Lemma 5. The equivalent channel W i is invariant under any permutation pi ∈ Πi.
Proof. We have
W i
(
ypi(1), . . . , ypi(2i)|xi
)
=
1
2i−1
∑
k∈Ai(xi)
P ⊗2
i
0 (ypi(1), . . . , ypi(2i))
P1(ypi(k))
P0(ypi(k))
(188)
(a)
=
1
2i−1
∑
k∈Ai(xi)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y1, . . . , y2i)
P1(yk)
P0(yk)
(189)
= W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi), (190)
where (a) follows because Ai(xi) is either J1, 2i−1K or J2i−1 + 1, 2iK depending on the value of xi, and from the
the definition of Πi, the summation has the same terms with and without the permutation pi. Therefore, W i is
invariant under any permutation pi ∈ Πi.
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B. Analysis of MSD
We now prove that we can achieve reliability for the MLC scheme with MSD if we use independent reliability
codes for the equivalent channel corresponding to each level. Note that the actual channel for each level is different
from the equivalent channel defined in (180) because of the use of codes for the lower levels instead of uniformly
distributed inputs. Let W i be the equivalent channel for level i as defined in (180). Let φi and ψi represent the
encoder and decoder for an (`,mi)-code for the i-th channel with rate Ri = mi` . We define the rate of the MLC
scheme as
R ,
q∑
i=1
Ri. (191)
Encoding: The encoder partitions the message W with `R bits into q messages such that the i-th message Wi
contains `Ri bits. It then uses φi to encode Wi into an `-bit sequence Xi = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,`). Let Xi:q,j ,
(Xi,j , Xi+1,j , . . . , Xq,j). The PPM mapper maps X1:q,j to x˜(X1:q,j) for j ∈ J1, `K as defined in (3) to form a
sequence of ` PPM symbols, which is transmitted over the channel.
Decoding: Let Y˜ = (Y˜1, · · · , Y˜`) be the received sequence, where Y˜i = (Yi,1, . . . , Yi,m). The decoder starts from
the level q and decodes the messages successively from level q to 1. To decode the i-th level, we assume that
estimates of Wi+1, . . . ,Wq are available at the decoder as Ŵi+1, · · · , Ŵq. The decoder also has the estimates of
the inputs to these decoded levels as X̂j , φ(Ŵj). It uses these estimates to form a sequence
Y˜Aq(Xˆi+1:q) ,
(
Y˜1,Aq(Xˆi+1:q,1), . . . , Y˜`,Aq(Xˆi+1:q,`)
)
, (192)
where Y˜k,Aq(Xˆi+1:q,k) , (Yk,t)t∈Aq(Xˆi+1:q,k). The decoder estimates the message Wi as
Ŵi , ψi(Y˜Aq(Xˆi+1:q)).
We define the decoding region of message wi for the decoder ψi as Dwi , {y˜ ∈ Y˜`i : ψi(y˜) = wi}.
Assumption: For y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜`), where y˜j = (yj,1, . . . , yj,2i), and for any permutation pi ∈ Π`i , we assume that
if y˜ ∈ Dwi , then pi(y˜) ∈ Dwi .
This assumption is reasonable because there exist efficient decoders such as the successive cancellation decoder for
polar codes that have this property.
Lemma 6. For the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes, y˜ ∈ Dwi =⇒ pi(y˜) ∈ Dwi for every pi ∈ Π`i .
Proof. Assume ` is a power of two. Let ui,1:` = xi,1:`G`, where G` is the polar code transform matrix defined in
[17]. In successive decoding of polar codes, the decoder produces the decision by computing
P
(
Uj = uj |Y˜ = y˜,U1:j−1 = uˆ1:j−1
)
=
∑
uj+1:`
pU1:`(uˆ1:j ,uj:`)(W
i)⊗`(y˜|xi)
pU1:j−1(u1:j−1)W i(y˜|u1:j−1)
, (193)
where
W i(y˜|u1:j) =
1∑
uj+1=0
· · ·
1∑
u`=0
(W i)⊗`(y˜|xi)p(uj+1, . . . , uq). (194)
From Lemma 5, we have
(W i)⊗` (pi(y˜)|xi) = (W i)⊗` (y˜|xi) . (195)
Hence, P
(
Uj = uj |Y˜ = y˜,U1:j−1 = uˆ1:j−1
)
is also invariant under the permutation pi and the result follows.
Lemma 7. Suppose we have a code (φi, ψi) for the channel
W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi) = 1
2i−1
∑
k∈Ai(xi)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y1, . . . , y2i)
P1(yk)
P0(yk)
, (196)
with rate Ri and probability of error i, such that ψi satisfies the above assumption on the decoding region. We
can then design a code for the MLC-PPM scheme with rate R =
∑q
i Ri and probability of error  =
∑q
i i.
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Proof. Let Ei , {Ŵi 6= Wi}. We can express the probability of error as follows:
P
(
(Ŵ1, · · · , Ŵq) 6= (W1, · · · ,Wq)
)
= P
(
q⋃
i=1
Ei
)
(197)
= P
 q⋃
i=1
Ei⋂ q⋂
j=i+1
Ecj
 (198)
=
q∑
i=1
P
Ei⋂ q⋂
j=i+1
Ecj
. (199)
Expanding one term of the summation, we obtain
P
Ei⋂ q⋂
j=i+1
Ecj
 = P(Ŵi 6= Wi, Ŵi+1 = Wi+1, · · · , Ŵq = Wq) (200)
=
∑
wi
· · ·
∑
wq
P
(
Ŵi 6= wi,Wi = wi, Ŵi+1 = Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = Wq = wq
)
(201)
=
∑
wi
· · ·
∑
wq
P
(
Ŵi+1 = Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = Wq = wq
)
P(Wi = wi)
P
(
Ŵi 6= wi
∣∣∣Wi = wi, Ŵi+1 = Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = Wq = wq ), (202)
and
P
(
Ŵi 6= wi|Ŵi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = wq,Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . ,Wq = wq
)
=
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
P
(
Y˜Aq(Xi+1:q) = y˜|Xi = xi, . . . ,Xq = xq
)
(203)
=
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1)
∏`
j=1
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1
(
yj,Ai(x1:i,j)
)
P0
(
yj,Ai(x1:i,j)
) (204)
=
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜) 6=wi
∏`
j=1
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1
(
yj,Ai(x1:i,j)
)
P0
(
yj,Ai(x1:i,j)
) (205)
=
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xi−1
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜) 6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
(206)
=
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
. (207)
where (206) results from the assumption on the decoding region. In fact, each term inside
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j) can be
obtained by permuting y˜j by one of the permutation defined earlier. Since, all those permutations are included in
the set {y˜ : ψi(y˜) 6= wi}, the same product term is repeated
(
2i−1
)` times.
Hence,
P
Ei⋂ q⋂
j=i+1
Ecj
 = ∑
wi
· · ·
∑
wq
P
(
Ŵi+1 = Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = Wq = wq
)
P(Wi = wi)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
(208)
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=
∑
wi
P(Wi = wi)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)∑
wi+1
· · ·
∑
wq
P
(
Ŵi+1 = Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . , Ŵq = Wq = wq
)
(209)
6
∑
wi
P(Wi = wi)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)∑
wi+1
· · ·
∑
wq
P(Wi+1 = wi+1, . . . ,Wq = wq) (210)
=
∑
wi
P(Wi = wi)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
. (211)
For the equivalent channel, the probability of error for a given input message is
P
(
Ŵ 6= wi|Wi = wi
)
=
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜) 6=wi
∏`
j=1
1
2i−1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
. (212)
Hence, the probability of error for the equivalent channel is given by
P
(
Ŵi 6= Wi
)
=
∑
wi
P(Wi = wi)P
(
Ŵ 6= wi|Wi = wi
)
(213)
=
∑
wi
P(Wi = wi)
∑
y˜:ψi(y˜)6=wi
(
1
2i−1
)` ∏`
j=1
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j)
P ⊗2
i
0 (y˜j)
P1 (yj,k)
P0 (yj,k)
. (214)
Since we know that P
(
Ŵi 6= Wi
)
6 i, we have
P
Ei⋂ q⋂
j=i+1
Ecj
 6 P(Ŵi 6= Wi) (215)
6 i. (216)
Therefore,
P
(
(Ŵ1, · · · , Ŵq) 6= (W1, · · · ,Wq)
)
6
q∑
i=1
i. (217)
C. Analysis of covertness
We now turn our attention to the covertness properties of the MLC scheme. Instead of dealing with relative
entropy, we work with the variational distance V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
between the distribution PZ˜ induced at the output
of the PPM super-channel when coding over ` PPM symbols of order m, and the distribution (QmPPM)
⊗`, which is
a product distribution over the ` uses of the super channel, and QmPPM is the output induced by a uniform input
distribution on PPM symbols of order m. For j ∈ J1, qK, assume that the codebook at level j consists of Mj
codewords Ci = {c(ij)}Mjij=1. Upon denoting the super channel transition probability W˜Z˜|X˜ by W˜ , we introduce
the distribution
P
(j)
Z˜
(z˜) =
1
2`
∑
x1∈{0,1}`
· · · 1
2`
∑
xj∈{0,1}`
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj , cj+1, . . . , cq) . (218)
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Intuitively, P (j)
Z˜
represents the distribution induced at Willie’s output when coding all levels from i down to q and
transmitting uniformly distributed bits on all lower levels. Note that P (0)
Z˜
= PZ˜ and P
(q)
Z˜
= (QmPPM)
⊗`. Using a
triangle inequality repeatedly, we obtain that
V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
6
q∑
j=1
V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P
(j)
Z˜
)
. (219)
Now, we can further upper bound V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P
(j)
Z˜
)
as
V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P j
Z˜
)
=
∑
z˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 12`
∑
x1
· · · 1
2`
∑
xj−1
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq 1
Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj−1, cj , cj+1, . . . , cq)− 1
2`
∑
xj
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, cj+1, . . . ,xj−1,xj , . . . , cq)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (220)
6 1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 12`
∑
x1
· · · 1
2`
∑
xj−1
 1
Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj−1, cj , cj+1, . . . , cq)
− 1
2`
∑
xj
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj−1,xj , cj+1, . . . , cq)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (221)
Notice that the two terms inside the absolute are distributions that only differ in that one has a coded j-th level,
while the other has an uncoded j-th level with uniform random bits.
Lemma 8. For every j ∈ J1, qK, consider the channel
W j(z1, . . . , z2j |xj) = 1
2j−1
∑
k∈Aj(xj)
Q⊗2
j
0 (z1, . . . , z2j )
Q1(zk)
Q0(zk)
. (222)
Let PZ˜(j) denote the output distribution induced by a code over this channel, and let Q
⊗`
Z˜(j)
denote the product output
distribution when the input is uniform. If V
(
PZ˜(j) , Q
⊗`
Z˜(j)
)
6 δj , then the same code ensures that V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P
(j)
Z˜
)
6
δj irrespective of the code used for the higher levels. Moreover, for the output of the super channel W˜Z˜|X1:q , these
codes together ensure V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
6
∑q
j=1 δj .
Proof. The result follows from observations similar to those in the proof of Lemma 7 regarding the symmetries of
the PPM modulation. Specifically, consider level j. For all codewords cj+1, · · · , cq used in the upper levels, we
have
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj−1, cj , . . . , cq) =
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
q
0 (z˜i)
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
, (223)
and
W˜ ⊗` (z˜|x1, . . . ,xj−1,xj , . . . , cq) =
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
q
0 (z˜i)
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
. (224)
Hence, we can bound V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P
(j)
Z˜
)
by substituting the above equations in (221) as
V
(
P
(j−1)
Z˜
, P j
Z˜
)
6 1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 12`
∑
x1
· · · 1
2`
∑
xj−1 1
Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
q
0 (z˜i)
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
− 1
2`
∑
xj
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
q
0 (z˜i)
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (225)
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(a)
=
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c
∏`
i′=1
∏
k′∈Aq(cj+1:q,i′ )c
Q0(zi′,k′)
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 12`
∑
x1
· · · 1
2`
∑
xj−1
 1
Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
− 1
2`
∑
xj
∏`
i=1
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (226)
=
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c
∏`
i′=1
∏
k′∈Aq(cj+1:q,i′ )c
Q0(zi′,k′)
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
∏`
i=1
1
2j−1
∑
x1,i
· · ·
∑
xj−1,i
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j−1,i,cj:q,i))
− 1
2`
∑
xj
∏`
i=1
1
2j−1
∑
x1,i
· · ·
∑
xj−1,i
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
Q0(zi,Aq(x1:j,i,cj+1:q,i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (227)
=
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c
∏`
i′=1
∏
k′∈Aq(cj+1:q,i′ )c
Q0(zi′,k′)
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Mj
∑
cj∈Cj
∏`
i=1
1
2j−1
∑
k∈Aq(cj:q,i)
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,k)
Q0(zi,k)
− 1
2`
∑
xj
∏`
i=1
1
2j−1
∑
k∈Aq(xj,i,cj+1:q,i)
Q⊗2
j
0 (z˜i,Aq(cj+1:q,i))
Q1(zi,k)
Q0(zi,k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (228)
=
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c
∏`
i′=1
∏
k′∈Aq(cj+1:q,i′ )c
Q0(zi′,k′)
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)
∣∣∣PZ˜(j)(z˜(j)(cj+1:q))−Q⊗`Z˜(j)(z˜(j)(cj+1:q))∣∣∣ (229)
=
1
Mj+1
∑
cj+1∈Cj+1
· · · 1
Mq
∑
cq∈Cq
∑
z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c
∏`
i′=1
∏
k′∈Aq(cj+1:q,i′ )c
Q0(zi′,k′)V
(
PZ˜(j) , Q
⊗`
Z˜(j)
)
(230)
= V
(
PZ˜(j) , Q
⊗`
Z˜(j)
)
(231)
6 δj , (232)
where (a) follows from dividing the summation over z˜ into summation over components z˜Aq(cj+1:q) defined as
in (192) and its complementary components denoted by z˜Aq(cj+1:q)c .
Hence, from (219), we have
V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
6
q∑
j
δj , (233)
which proves the lemma.
Lemma 8 may be viewed as the counterpart of Lemma 7 for resolvability instead of reliability. Since the equivalent
channel (222) is again invariant with the number of levels q > i, we conclude that we can design channel resolvability
codes for a fixed channel while still growing the number of levels with the code length.
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To conclude regarding the ability to achieve covertness with the multilevel scheme, we note with calculations
similar to [5, (77)-(79)] that
D
(
PZ˜‖Q⊗n0
)
6 D
(
PZ˜‖(QmPPM)⊗`
)
+ 2V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
max
z˜
`
∣∣∣∣log (QmPPM)(z˜)Q⊗m0 (z˜)
∣∣∣∣+ D((QmPPM)⊗`‖Q⊗n0 ), (234)
and using [20, (323)]
D
(
PZ˜‖(QmPPM)⊗`
)
6 ` log
(
1
minz˜(Q
m
PPM)
⊗`(z˜)
)
V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
. (235)
Consequently, provided V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
decays fast enough at each level and with ` scaling as in [14], we may
ensure covertness at a throughput close to the covert capacity.
D. Towards a concrete polynomial-complexity instantiation
The key observation to instantiate actual codes is that the problem reduces to constructing codes for the equivalent
channels identified in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. If the original channels are degraded, then the equivalent channels
are also degraded as shown in (164-167). Since the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes satisfies the
assumption on the decoding regions that we used for the proof of reliability, polar codes would be a suitable
solution to achieve the covert capacity. In fact, we know from [21] how to design polar codes simultaneously for
reliability and resolvability, with a negligible amount of shared randomness and metrics (probability of error and
variational distance) that decay fast with the blocklength. Such constructions would carry over directly. One subtle
point is how to address coding for the higher and very noisy levels. In fact, achieving reliability would be next to
impossible at such low rates, and one would therefore not communicate over these levels, and just achieve channel
resolvability using bits of private randomness. The top most levels have a rate that vanishes with the block length,
and one concern is whether polarization happens fast enough at these levels. Lemma 3 shows that the rate decays
exponentially with q and as the inverse of m. Polarization, however, only happens at a rate 1mγ for some γ < 1,
which will therefore force us to overestimate the number of random bits to input. Fortunately, the number of levels
is logarithmic in m, so that the rate of private randomness remains negligible.
1) Coding scheme using polar codes: In the following theorem, we show that we can achieve the covert capacity
of a BI-DMC using polar codes.
Theorem 1. Fix positive constants ζ and δ. For n large enough, there exist low-complexity polar coding schemes
for each level of MLC-PPM scheme described in previous sections with covert rate at least
√
2D(P1‖P0)√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
− ζ, with
probability of error at most ζ, and D(PZ‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ + ζ.
Proof. Let m be the least power of two greater than
⌊√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)n
2δ
⌋
and ` ,
⌊
n
m
⌋
. We consider an MLC-PPM
scheme with the number of levels q = log2m in which the transmission occurs in blocks of ` PPM symbols of order
m. Since Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel, for each level i ∈ J1, qK, the channel W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi)
defined in (222) is also degraded w.r.t. the channel W i(y1, · · · , y2i |xi) defined in (180). Let QZ˜(i) represent the
distribution induced at the output of W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi) when the input to the channel is uniformly distributed. Let
RYi , I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)−
A
`κ
, and RZi , I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) +
A
`κ
.
Then, for some β ∈]0, 12 [ and  ∈]0, 1− 2β[, by [11, Proposition 3, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2], there exist constants
κ, A, and C and low-complexity polar codes Ci for each level i ∈ J1, qK with rate Ri , max(RYi , RZi ) such that
if `Ri bits are coded into a binary codeword of length ` > 2C and transmitted over both W i(y1, · · · , y2i |xi) and
W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi), for the distribution PZ˜(i) induced at the output of the channel W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi) , we have
V
(
PZ˜(i) , Q
⊗`
Z˜(i)
)
6 O(
√
`2−`β) and a probability of error upper-bounded by O(`2−`β). Note that we need Ri > RZi
to ensure channel resolvability and when RZi > R
Y
i , we need key with rate R
Z
i −RYi .
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If the decoder uses the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes, by Lemma 7, the probability of error is
upper bounded by O(q`2−`β), which is less than ζ for large enough n. For covertness, first notice that by Lemma 8,
we have V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
6 O(q
√
`2−`β). Thus, from (234) and (235), we have
D
(
PZ˜‖Q⊗n0
)
6 ` log
(
1
minz˜ Q
m
PPM(z˜)
)
V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
+ D
(
(QmPPM)
⊗`‖Q⊗n0
)
+ 2V
(
PZ˜, (Q
m
PPM)
⊗`
)
max
z˜
`
∣∣∣∣log QmPPM(z˜)Q⊗m0 (z˜)
∣∣∣∣ . (236)
We have
QmPPM(z˜) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
Q1(zi)
m∏
j=1,j 6=i
Q0(zj) (237)
> 1
m
µ1µ
m−1
0 , (238)
where µ0 = minz∈supp(Q0)Q0(z) and µ1 = minz∈supp(Q1)Q1(z). Hence,
log
(
1
minz˜ Q
m
PPM(z˜)
)
6 (m− 1) log 1
µ0
+ log
m
µ1
. (239)
We also have
QmPPM(z˜)
Q⊗m0 (z˜)
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
Q1(zi)
Q0(zi)
. (240)
Hence,
µ1
m
6 Q
m
PPM(z˜)
Q⊗m0 (z˜)
6 1
µ0
, (241)
and ∣∣∣∣log QmPPM(z˜)Q⊗m0 (z˜)
∣∣∣∣ 6 max(log mµ1 , log 1µ0
)
. (242)
For large enough m, we have ∣∣∣∣log QmPPM(z˜)Q⊗m0 (z˜)
∣∣∣∣ 6 log mµ1 . (243)
From (107), we obtain
D
(
(QmPPM)
⊗`‖Q⊗n0
)
6 δ +O( 1
m
). (244)
Therefore, (236) becomes
D
(
PZ˜‖Q⊗n0
)
6 δ +O( 1
m
) +O(q`2
√
`2−`β), (245)
which is less than δ + ζ for large enough `.
Finally, the number of transmitted bits is
`RYi > `
q∑
i=1
(
I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q)− A
`κ
)
(246)
= `
(
I(X˜; Y˜ )−O
( q
`κ
))
. (247)
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The covert throughput is given by
`
∑q
i=1R
Y
i√
m`δ
>
√
`
mδ
(
I(X˜; Y˜ )−O
( q
`κ
))
(248)
=
√
2
χ2(Q1||Q0)
(
I(X˜; Y˜ )−O
( q
`κ
))
(249)
=
√
2
χ2(Q1||Q0)
(
D(P1‖P0)−O
(
1
m
)
−O
( q
`κ
))
. (250)
From Section IV-B6, we know that for degraded case, I(Xi; Y˜ |Xi+1:q) > I(Xi; Z˜|Xi+1:q) for all i ∈ J1, qK. Hence,
the number of key bits required is
`(RZi −RYi ) 6 `
q∑
i=1
2A
`κ
= `O
( q
`κ
)
, (251)
and the key throughput is
`(RZi −RYi )√
m`δ
6 O
( q
`κ
)
. (252)
Hence, this coding scheme achieves the covert capacity.
2) Coding scheme using invertible extractors: We can further reduce the complexity of the coding scheme using
invertible extractors for channel resolvability. Since the capacity of the higher levels goes to zero exponentially, we
can use the first few levels to code for reliability and only use the higher levels to achieve channel resolvability. Let
u represent the number of levels used to code for reliability. We can simplify the code construction by constructing
a single code for all the higher levels. If we take the levels from u+ 1 to q as a single channel, the corresponding
channel is given by
W u+1:q (z˜|xu+1:q) = 1
2u
∑
k∈Aq(xu+1:q)
Q⊗2
q
0 (z˜)
Q1(zk)
Q0(zk)
. (253)
This channel is symmetric in the sense that for all xu+1:q and x′u+1:q, there exists a permutation of the components
of z˜ denoted by pixu+1:q+x′u+1:q such that
W u+1:q(pixu+1:q+x′u+1:q(z˜)|xu+1:q) = W u+1:q(z˜|x′u+1:q). (254)
For ` independent uses of this channel with input vectors xu+1:q and x′u+1:q, we represent the component-wise
permutation of z˜ by pi`xu+1:q+x′u+1:q .
We follow a construction of codes using invertible extractors similar to the ones used in [22], [23]. Let Ext be
a two-universal extractor defined as
Ext : S× F(q−u)`2 → F(q−u)`−k2 : (s, x) 7→ b,
and Inv be the inverter of Ext defined as
Inv : S× F(q−u)`−k2 × Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : (s, b, r) 7→ xu+1:q.
Let Ps,b , {x ∈ F(q−u)`2 : Ext(s, x) = b}. We assume that Ext is regular, that is, {Ps,b}b∈F(q−u)`−k2 forms a partition
of F(q−u)`2 into bins of equal size. For a given s ∈ S and b ∈ F(q−u)`−k2 , the encoder φ is given by
φ : Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : r 7→ Inv(s, b, r).
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Let PZ˜ be the distribution induced by the coding scheme given by
PZ˜(z˜) =
∑
xu+1:q∈Ps,b
1
|Ps,b|W
(u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|xu+1:q) (255)
=
∑
xu+1:q∈Ps,b
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q), (256)
and QZ˜ be the distribution induced by an uniformly distributed input given by
QZ˜(z˜) =
∑
xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q). (257)
Lemma 9. The encoder φ defined above with rate Ru+1:q = k` with s and b selected randomly according to uniform
distributions qS and qB , respectively, satisfies
lim
`→∞
ES,B
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
= 0, (258)
if Ru+1:q > I(Xu+1:q; Z˜) + 2H(Z˜).
Proof. We define a typical set as follows:
T ` (Xu+1:q, Z˜) ,
{
(xu+1, . . . ,xq, z˜) ∈ X ` × · · · × X ` × Z˜` : 1
`
log
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
QZ˜(z˜)
< I(Xu+1:q; Z˜) + 
}
.
(259)
We have
ES,B
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
=
∑
s,b
qS(s)qB(b)
∑
z˜
∑
xu+1:q∈Ps,b
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
log
∑x¯u+1:q∈Ps,bW (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|x¯u+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (260)
(a)
=
∑
s,b,z˜,xu+1:q
qS(s)
1
2(q−u)`
1 {Ext(s,xu+1:q) = b}W (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|xu+1:q)
log
∑x¯u+1:q 1 {Ext(s, x¯u+1:q) = b}W (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|x¯u+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (261)
(b)
6
∑
z˜,xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
log
∑s,x¯u+1:q qS(s)1 {Ext(s, x¯u+1:q) = Ext(s,xu+1:q)}W (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|x¯u+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (262)
(c)
6
∑
z˜,xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
log
 ∑
x¯u+1:q 6=xu+1:q
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|x¯u+1:q)2
−((q−u)`−k)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
+
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (263)
(d)
6
∑
z˜,xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q) log
[
1 +
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
]
(264)
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(e)
6
∑
(z˜,xu+1:q)∈T ` (Xu+1:q,Z˜)
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q) log
[
1 + 2−`(Ru+1:q−I(Xu+1:q;Z˜)−)
]
+
∑
(z˜,xu+1:q)/∈T ` (Xu+1:q,Z˜)
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q) log
[
1 + µ−`z
]
(265)
6 2−`(Ru+1:q−I(Xu+1:q;Z˜)−) + `
µz
P
(
(Xu+1:q, Z˜) /∈ T ` (Xu+1:q, Z˜)
)
(266)
6 2−`(Ru+1:q−I(Xu+1:q;Z˜)−) + `
µz
e−
2`2
q2
`→∞−→ 0, (267)
where (a) follows from qB(b) = 12(q−u)`−k and from the definition of Ps,b, (b) follows by Jensen’s inequality, (c) fol-
lows because Ext is two-universal and hence, for all x¯u+1:q 6= xu+1:q, we have PS(Ext(S, x¯u+1:q) = Ext(S,xu+1:q)) =∑
s qS(s)1 {Ext(s, x¯u+1:q) = Ext(s,xu+1:q)} 6 2−((q−u)`−k), (d) follows because from the definition of QZ˜(z˜), we
have
∑
x¯u+1:q 6=xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`W
(u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|x¯u+1:q) 6 QZ˜(z˜) and (e) follows from bounding the term inside log from
the definition of the typical set and using the definition µz = minz∈supp(QZ)QZ(z).
We now employ a specific extractor. For s ∈ S = F(q−u)`2 \{0}, define
Ext : S× F(q−u)`2 → F(q−u)`−k2 : (s, x) 7→ b , (s−1  x)|J1,(q−u)`−kK, (268)
where  is the multiplication in the field F(q−u)`2 and (·)|J1,(q−u)`−kK represents the bits in the positions J1, (q − u)`K.
Ext is a two-universal hash function [22], whose inverter is given by
Inv : S× F(q−u)`−k2 × Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : (s, b, r) 7→ s (b‖r), (269)
where (·‖·) denotes the concatenation of two sequences of bits. We now show that for the encoder implemented
using this inverter, the divergence is same for any b. We can express QZ˜ as follows:
QZ˜(z˜) =
∑
xu+1:q
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q) (270)
=
∑
b∈F(q−u)`−k2
∑
r∈Fk2
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|s (b||r)) (271)
=
∑
b∈F(q−u)`−k2
∑
r∈Fk2
1
2(q−u)`
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(pi`s(b′||0)(z˜)|s (b⊕ b′||r)) (272)
= QZ˜(pi
`
s(b′||0)(z˜)). (273)
Taking expectation of the divergence between PZ˜ and QZ˜ over S for a fixed b, we have
ES,B=b
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
=
∑
s
qS(s)
∑
z˜
∑
xu+1:q∈Ps,b
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|xu+1:q)
log
∑x¯u+1:q∈Ps,bW (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|x¯u+1:q)
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (274)
=
∑
s
qS(s)
∑
z˜
∑
r∈Fk2
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜|s (b||r))
log
∑r′∈Fk2 W (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜|s (b||r′))
2kQZ˜(z˜)
 (275)
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=
∑
s
qS(s)
∑
z˜
∑
r∈Fk2
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(pi`s(b⊕b′||0)(z˜)|s (b′||r))
log
∑r′∈Fk2 W (u+1:q)⊗`(pi`s(b⊕b′||0)(z˜)|s (b′||r′))
2kQZ˜(pi
`
s(b⊕b′||0)(z˜))
 (276)
=
∑
s
qS(s)
∑
z˜′
∑
r∈Fk2
1
2k
W (u+1:q)
⊗`
(z˜′|s (b′||r))
log
∑r′∈Fk2 W (u+1:q)⊗`(z˜′|s (b′||r′))
2kQZ˜(z˜
′)
 (277)
= ES,B=b′
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
. (278)
Hence, from (258)
lim
`→∞
ES,B=b
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
= lim
`→∞
ES,B
[
D
(
PZ˜‖QZ˜
)]
= 0. (279)
From the above, we conclude that the choice of b is irrelevant for achieving channel resolvability. Hence, we can
choose b = 0. Finally, note that we do not require S to be private, so we can use publicly available common
randomness as the source for S, and we can reduce the rate of S by using a chaining strategy similar to the one
in [23].
VI. CONCLUSION
Coding for covert communication over a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) requires biasing the input distri-
bution so that codewords of length n contain only on the order of
√
n non-innocent symbols. This requirement is
challenging to achieve using known codes; in fact, we have shown that it is impossible to achieve covertness using
linear codes. We have overcome this challenge using PPM by transforming the original channel into a PPM super
channel over which a uniform input distribution of PPM symbols achieves the covert capacity. Direct coding over
this PPM super channel would require coding over non-binary alphabets by mapping each PPM symbol to a non-
binary alphabet; moreover, the order of the PPM symbols and the alphabet size would scale with the blocklength.
MLC solves this problem by transforming coding over the PPM super channel into coding over several binary-
input channels. Although the number of levels scales with the blocklength, we showed that most of the capacity
concentrates in the first few levels and the equivalent channel corresponding to each level is a stationary memoryless
channel. Further, we have shown that one can independently design codes for each level by constructing codes for
the equivalent channels, which in turn achieve overall reliability and channel resolvability under mild assumptions
regarding some symmetry conditions on the decoder. In particular, one may use polar codes because the successive
cancellation decoder for polar codes satisfies the symmetry requirement. Finally, since the first few levels concentrate
most of the capacity, one may code a limited number of levels for reliability and only code the remaining levels
for resolvability using a negligible number of key bits. We have also shown how to code for channel resolvability
on all of those remaining levels at once using invertible extractors, further reducing the complexity of the design.
While the discussion has focused on binary-input DMCs, the proposed coding schemes achieves reliability and
covertness over any DMC, but without reaching the covert capacity in general. Extending the coding scheme to
achieve the covert capacity is certainly possible, for instance by allowing more than a single non-innocent symbol
in the PPM scheme.
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